Introduction
Trade theorists, since the pioneering work of Kemp (1966) . have considered the question of national advantage from international factor mobility by considering only one factor to be so mobile. Kemp analyzed elegantly the question of optimal policies in 2 x 2 x 2 model and showed that, since monopoly power could exist in both the goods and factor markets in consequence of international capital mobility, the optimal policy intervention would generally involve two policy instruments: tariffs (-cum-subsidies) on goods and duties(-cum-subsidies) on international capital flows. Jones (1967) subsequently extended Kemp's argument to the secondbest context by examining the optimal level of one of these instruments when the other was arbitrarily set at zero. Elsewhere in this issue, Brecher (1983) shows, in an elegant and original contribution, that the Jones policy problem is, in fact, a third-best, rather than a second-best, problem, as generally believed, and that if only one of the tariff and capital mobility taxes(-cumsubsidies) can be used, it is generally possible to improve welfare further by admitting an altogether different, domestic policy instrument: namely a production or consumption tax-cum-subsidy, as the case may be.' *The research of Bhagwati was supported by the German Marshall Fund Grant No. l-34015. The problem analyzed in the paper was posed in Bhagwati (1979) and an early ingenious and neglected analysis in Ramaswami (1968) was noted by Bhagwati. We have profited greatly from these contributions; also from reading Webb (1970) , Ramaswami (1970) and a recent paper of Calvo and Wellisz (1983) on this problem.
'This result is in consonance with the results of Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) for the case without international capital mobility; but the consonance is 'intuitive' only after the result was established for the case with international capital mobility.
Interesting as this line of analysis is, it is based on two critical assumptions:
(1) that the other country is passive in the face of policymaking by one country, exactly as in the orthodox analysis of optimal policy intervention which assumed that the foreign offer curve facing a country is given exogenously; and (2) that the other factor of production (labour, in the usual 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of international capital mobility) is internationally immobile. The former assumption is traditional in the international-economictheoretic literature on optimal policies for open economies, with such classic exceptions as the theory of optimum tariffs with retaliation, as developed by Scitovsky (1942 ), Johnson (1953 and later writers.
But the latter assumption is more crippling in ruling out of consideration the fact of international labour mobility and, indeed, its systematic regulation by the policy instrument of immigration restrictions by nation states since the beginning of the twentieth century. As it happens, an important and novel question that has appeared in the policy context is precisely whether it would be to the national advantage of a'capital-abundant country to export capital (a la the Marxist-Leninist prediction of monopoly capitalism) or to import labour (as countries such as West Germany did through their gastarbeiter programs in the postwar period). Bhagwati (1979) 
raised this question in the Ramaswami
Memorial Lecture as follows:
The problem is best illustrated with regard to the migration of labor to the United States. As you are doubtless aware, the USA has an enormous inflow of illegal migrants who come in principally from Latin America and, in turn, mostly from Mexico. The immigration barriers have not been successful in stemming this inflow which is variously estimated as having led to a stock of close to 10 million illegal immigrants.
In response to this inflow, and as a result of the growing and effective trade union pressures, the Carter administration has had to take cognizance of the problem in its social, legal and economic dimensions.
In this context, it has occasionally been suggested that the United States ought to encourage the flow of funds, both private and public, in order to create more prosperity in Mexico to reduce the economic disparities that fuel the illegal exodus.
With regard to the deployment of public funds, in the form of foreign assistance, towards this end, it is of course possible to think of this as a bribe to the countries of illegal emigration to use their control machinery more effectively to stem the illegal migration. is not such a straightforward matter. As the discussion of the proposal of Bhagwati's (1978) to 'tax the brain drain' made manifest, the (discriminatory) taxation by the country of residence of foreign labour is fraught with numerous difficulties from legal, constitutional, human-rights and political standpoints.' Therefore, the economic theorist must rank-order, as in Ramaswami's (1968) classic paper, not just the optimal taxation of outflowing capital by the capital-rich country with the optimal taxation of incoming (foreign) labour by the capital-rich country.
A realistic policy comparison must augment the policy set to include therefore the rankordering of policies where the discriminatory taxation of incoming foreign labour is not allowed, thus permitting an asymmetry in the tax-jurisdictional scope in regard to the taxation of one's capital outflow and the taxation of the other's labour outflow into one's country. ' Many of these difficulties are discussed in Bhagwati and Partington (1976) . However, they do not extend to the country of nationaky exercising income tax jurisdiction over its citizens resident abroad. What we are discussing in the text is the country of residence exercising its own tax jurisdiction in an overtly discriminatory fashion on foreign residents: e.g. by levying a 10 percent surcharge on the income of foreigners resident in the country. The economics of the former question has been explored in a Symposium in the Journal of Public Economics (vol. 18, no. 3, 1982) by Bhagwati (1982) , Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) , Baumol (1982) , Mirrlees (1982) and Wilson (1982a Wilson ( , 1982b .
Second, international labour mobility raises the added difficulty that, once labour crosses national borders, we have to worry about which country's welfare it ought to be included in. As Bhagwati (1979) has argued, the investment of capital abroad does not affect, in principle, the group over which 'national' welfare will be defined. By contrast, the 'migration' of human beings raises the question:
Which national group do the migrants belong to? There is no universal answer to this question. Migrants who are temporary, because of explicit rules in that regard as with gastarbeiters in Western Europe and imported workers in the oil-rich Middle East, evidently will classify as part of the 'national' population in the country of origin. But what of permanently emigrating nationals? If they do 'go away' for good, there is a convincing case for treating 'national' welfare as defined only over 'those left behind'. On the other hand, as seems to be the case today with a large fraction of the highly skilled migration from the less developed countries to the developed countries, if this migrant population is characterized by retention of ethnic ties to the country of origin, a high frequency of visits and even continuation of citizenship status in many cases, the fact of permanent migration (embodied in the holding of immigrant visas) is thoroughly compatible with the analyst including such migrants in the definition of 'national' welfare for the country of origin. When we rank-order the optimal taxation of capital outflow with the optimal taxation of labour inflow, as in Ramaswami (1968), we are treating the foreign labour as part of the foreign country's welfare function. But then we need also to consider the possibility that it may be regarded, after immigration, to be part of one's own welfare.
In the analysis below of the choice between capital and labour mobility from the viewpoint of national advantage, therefore, we will be mindful of these important asymmetries introduced by international labour, as against capital, mobility. We will utilize Ramaswami's one-good model, which eliminates the necessity to look simultaneously at the implications in the goods market that lead to the complexity of the KempJones-Brecher analysis. Using this model, we will consider the welfare-effects in a twocountry model where the capital-rich country uses (1) a free international factor mobility policy, (2) a quota policy in regard to capital outflow and labour inflow, (3) an optimal capital-outflow tax policy, and (4) alternative discriminatory tax policies on inflow of labour. Evidently, policies (lH3) do not, but policies (4) do, require having to differentially tax 'immigrant' labour; and where the differential taxation of foreign labour is inadmissible, the rank-ordering of policies will have to exclude policies (4). We will principally consider, in section 2, the case where welfare of immigrant labour is considered part of only foreign welfare. 3 In section 3, however, we briefly 3Also see the analysis in Calve and Wellisz (1983) capital in Mexico, will be D'C, and hence American GNP will again be 0,C; American gain from the autarkic position will again be RC; and Mexican gain can similarly be shown to be CS. Of course, if only one of these policies is utilized, the other factor will move internationally until the world equilibrium winds up along DD', creating the same outcome as under free factor mobility. Suppose, however, that both quotas are utilized simultaneously. Take then two polar cases: (i) no capital outflow is permitted and labour inflow is restricted below ED; and (ii) no labour inflow is permitted and capital outflow is restricted below ED'.
Quotas on factor mobility
In the former case it is readily seen that, given the capital immobility, the restriction of labour inflow below ED is welfare-worsening for America. For, if more Mexcan labour comes in, it produces increasing gain to America by driving down its own reward due to diminishing returns: and this continues until the inflow is stopped by wage equalization between both countries at D. Therefore, any immigration restriction that restricts the Mexican labour inflow below ED will reduce American gain below RC and reduce world gain below RS by pushing the world allocation off the contract curve O*O,. As for Mexico, it will also gain from the restricted outflow of its labour to America and its gain may be less or greater than or equal to CS (which is the gain from unrestricted outflow up to ED). Consider now the latter case, where the labour flow is eliminated but America does not allow full outflow of American capital by amount ED' to reach the contract curve. We then have an asymmetric result for America. For, from the American standpoint, it will pay America to restrict the outflow of capital to the point where the marginal return abroad equals its marginal product at home. This optimal export restriction on capital outflow, say EF, will then produce for America a gain exceeding RC; the world will gain less than RS; and Mexico will gain less than CS.
Thus, we have the asymmetrical result that, if only labour inflow is to be permitted, capital-rich America ought to allow it to the free-immigration level; whereas, if only capital outflow is to be permitted, America ought to restrict it. This asymmetry, of course, follows from the fact that American capital is essentially driving down its reward in Mexico and hence its marginal return is below its average return there so that restriction of capital outflow below the free-outflow level is desirable; whereas when Mexican labour is coming into America, it is Mexico that is correspondingly losing (part of its) gains from the labour outflow to higher-wage America, and therefore it is America that is gaining, so that American advantage (though not Mexican advantage, of course) is best pursued by America letting Mexican labour come in freely! The welfare outcomes under these alternative policies are readily illustrated by reference to the familiar marginal-product curves in figs. 2 and 3 for the capital-flow and the labour-flow cases, respectively. In fig. 2 
Capital-outflow Policies
But the rank-ordering of policies just derived depends critically on the assumption that America cannot levy discriminatory taxation on foreign labour as an instrument of policy. This yields an advantage, as we have just seen, to capital-outflow vis-i-vis the labour-inflow policies in America when it maximizes its national advantage.
But as soon as we admit the possibility of levying taxation on immigrant (but not on national) labour, this advantage gets reversed, as we note immediately below. 
Labour -inflow Policies
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Discriminatory taxation of foreign labour
First, we should note that discriminatory taxation of American capital outflow by America produces an identical result as the American restriction of such outflow which we just discussed. Table 2 Optimal labour inflow policy.
Gain
World-efficient and optimal-for-America labour inflow (ED)
1. World gain 2. American gain 3. Mexican gain 
Optimal tax on labour injlow
On the other hand, the discriminatory taxation of Mexican labour by America enables America to gain more than it would simply by restricting Mexican labour inflow to a level identical to that produced by the tax policy. For example, in fig. 3 , if Mexican labour inflow is restricted to EG by a quota, it will yield a gain WXV to America. But if this inflow is achieved by a tax on Mexican labour that effectively shifts the Mexican supply curve NPY up to cut WVY at K the American gain will be WVPQ (> WI/X by XVPQ, the tax revenues from the Mexican inflow of EG at tax rate VP/PG). And, for an optimal tax policy by America, this gain for America will exceed that under free immigration (i.e. WMY). That is to say, if I/ were obtained, and the corresponding optimal tax rate was set by taking the marginal curve to NPY and intersecting it with WVX we would be equating the marginal cost of Mexican labour supply to its marginal product in America and thus showing VPlPG as the welfare-maximizing American tax on Mexican labour. Such an optimal labour-inflow tax policy by America will therefore yield a gain exceeding RC in fig. 1 , while it will get the world allocation off the contract curve and reduce world gain below RS. Mexico, on the other hand, will find its gain reduced below CS. Ramaswami (1968) ingeniously showed, moreover, that such an optimal tax policy on inflowing Mexican labour would produce a greater gain to America than the optimal tax-cum-restriction on American capital outflow. Yet another policy may be considered, which taxes away all the gains from Mexican labour inflow by taxing in a 'perfectly discriminatory' fashion. Thus, in fig. 3 , assume that America can tax each Mexican labourer to extract the full difference between his American marginal product (= wage) and his Mexican marginal product (= wage forgone).
In that case, the entire world gain W YN from the Mexican labour inflow will accrue to America and the Mexican non-migrant population will suffer a loss equal to wages earned in America by the migrants. By reference to fig. 1 , we can readily see that the world resource allocation will shift from E to (Pareto-efficient) D, the world gain will be RS, the American gain will also be RS, and the Mexican gain will be zero.
The results of these two types of discriminatory-taxation policies are presented in table 3. Table 3 Discriminatory tax policies on labour inflow. 
PQN (<CS)
World-efficient, perfectly-discriminatory tax on labour inflow (ED) 
Rank-ordering of alternative.policies
From the viewpoint of American advantage, therefore, we get a remarkable and strong rank-ordering of policies: perfectly-discriminatory tax on labour inflow > optimal tax on labour inflow > optimal tax-cum-restriction on capital outflow >free factor mobility>restriction on labour inflow. Of this rankordering, it is the dominance of the optimal tax on labour outflow over the optimal tax on capital inflow that Ramaswami (1968) established.
Immigrants' welfare not necessarily part of only foreign welfare
The analysis so far has assumed that Mexican migrants' welfare continues to be part of only Mexican welfare. We must however address a few pertinent remarks to the possibility where this is not the case. Thus, the Mexican migrants' welfare may be regarded as part of American welfare. [We should also reckon with the possibilities that the migrants' welfare is not counted in either Mexican or American welfare, and that alternatively (in a benign world) it is considered by American and Mexican policymakers to be part of both rather than neither!] Simply to illustrate the differences in conclusions that can arise, once these considerations are introduced, we focus here on the case where the Mexican migrant labour becomes part of American welfare (as indeed it unambiguously would if, after the 5-year residence requirement, naturalization ensued). The basic difficulty that this change of assumption about the national characterization of initially Mexican labour makes is that the different policy rankings that we considered in the section 2 are no longer welfarecomparable, without added assumptions, since the population over which they are defined will generally differ. Thus, the capital-export policies will involve the initial American population; whereas the labour quota and taxation policies will each result in different levels of immigration of Mexican labour and hence of the American population. Given this problem, the analyst has no option but to settle for welfare criteria such as the resulting per capita income level under alternative policies, or some explicit cardinal weighting of the different individuals under the different policy options. Thus, consider the per capita income criterion and focus on American advantage to see how the rank-ordering of our policies can change from that derived in section 2. Turning to fig. 1 , it is then easy to see that free factor mobility, to any point on the diagonal stretch bD', will yield an identical per capita income level so that all points on DD' continue to be weakly-ranked. However, the optimum optimorum perfectly-discriminating tax policy on Mexican labour inflow is no longer superior to the policy of free factor mobility since the fact that it transfers the gains from the Mexican migrants to pre-migration American natives is no longer an advantage!
